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Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires 
§1 Introduction 
Why is it that some people’s lives go well for them, and others’ lives go badly for them? In other 
words: what makes the difference between higher and lower well-being?  According to one popular line of 
thought, the difference is to be explained at least partly in terms of desire satisfaction. For example: suppose 
I planted some tulips, and I desire that they survived the winter. Plausibly, then, my life is going better 
for me if my tulips did indeed survive. My well-being is increased if they are still living. Plausibly, also, 
the degree to which my well-being is increased is proportional to the strength of my desire—the more I want 
my tulips to live, the better it is for me if this desire is satisfied. This is an instance of what I will call the 
Satisfaction Thesis. 
The Satisfaction Thesis does not tell us what happens if my tulips did not survive the winter. But 
the most natural answer is that the death of my tulips would decrease my well-being. And, the stronger my 
desire, the worse it is for me if my desire is frustrated. This is an instance of what I will call the Frustration 
Thesis. Philosophers have given comparatively little attention to the subject of desire frustration, but 
insofar as they have done so, they have tended to endorse this Frustration Thesis (Kagan 2014; Heathwood 
2016). Putting the Frustration Thesis together with the Satisfaction Thesis, we arrive at what I will call the 
basic desire view. 
In this paper I have two aims. First, I will raise a problem for the basic desire view. The problem 
stems from the fact that some desires are normatively asymmetrical: they have greater positive than negative 
significance for well-being, or vice versa. Having those desires and satisfying them increases our well-being 
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more or less than having those desires and frustrating them decreases our well-being. We have such desires 
when we are strongly attracted to p without being strongly averse to ~p, and when we are strongly averse to 
p without being strongly attracted to ~p.1 Asymmetrical desires make trouble for the basic desire view. 
Accordingly, my second aim is to revise the basic desire view to escape the trouble. I contend that there is 
no single attitude which is truly described by both the Satisfaction Thesis and the Frustration Thesis. 
Instead, we should say that each of those Theses describes a different psychological attitude: attraction 
and aversion, respectively. Attraction satisfaction is good, but attraction frustration is not bad. Aversion 
frustration2 is bad, but aversion satisfaction is not good. Some desires—namely, asymmetrical desires—
involve attractions and aversions of different strengths. That is why those desires have asymmetrical 
 
1 Although modern desire theorists have had relatively little to say about the distinction between attraction and 
aversion, the distinction arguably featured in the inception of the theory. Thomas Hobbes, often cited as an early 
proponent of a desire-based theory of well-being, writes:  
…whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire that is it which he for his part calleth 
good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil...  (1651, ch.6) 
Since Hobbes seems to deny that anything is good or evil “simply” or “absolutely”, he can plausibly be read as offering 
a theory of what is good for subjects—in other words, a theory of well-being. And the theory seems to suggest that 
appetite/desire and hate/ aversion differ substantively in their significance for well-being, as opposed to merely being 
different ways of signifying the same underlying attitude. 
2 There is a strict sense of “satisfaction” and “frustration” on which one’s attitude is satisfied just in case its content 
obtains, and is frustrated otherwise. In this sense, a case of “aversion frustration” is a case in which one is averse to a 
state of affairs which does not obtain. But in the present context I think it is more natural to understand “satisfaction” 
and “frustration” in a more metaphorical sense: some of our attitudes (such as attraction and aversion) aim at making 
the world a certain way, and they are satisfied just in case the world is that way. Otherwise they are frustrated. I 
intend for “aversion frustration” to be understood in this more metaphorical sense. So a case of “aversion 
frustration”, as I use the phrase, is a case in which one is averse to a state of affairs which does obtain.  In using 
“frustration” in this way, I follow Kagan (2014) and Sumner (2014).  
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significance for well-being. Thus, asymmetrical desires reveal something about the internal structure of 
desire. 
I will begin in §2 by describing the basic desire view in greater detail, and by introducing the 
distinction between attraction and aversion. Then in §3 I will use the distinction to argue for the existence 
of asymmetrical desires. Along the way I will argue that nothing more than the attraction/aversion 
distinction is needed to account for these desires. In §4 I consider a few challenges for the 
attraction/aversion strategy which have been raised in passing by Shelly Kagan and Wayne Sumner. I 
argue that these challenges can be met. I take stock of my conclusions in §5. 
§2 Terms and Conditions 
The basic desire view—henceforth simply “the desire view”—is a view about which things are non-
derivatively good and bad for us, where “good for us” and “bad for us” are understood in terms of well-
being. On my usage, a state of affairs is good for a subject insofar as it increases their well-being, and bad 
for a subject insofar as it decreases their well-being. Well-being, in turn, is the kind of value at issue when 
we say that someone’s life is going well or badly for them. To get a fix on the concept, it is helpful to note 
that well-being seems to bear certain connections to our attitudes. It seems that, all else being equal, it is 
appropriate to feel sorry for those we regard as having lower well-being than us, and to feel glad for those 
we regard as having higher well-being than us. Furthermore, well-being seems to bear a connection to 
desert. Insofar as people deserve to be rewarded or punished, they can get what they deserve by having 
their well-being raised and lowered, respectively. One or both of these claims about well-being might turn 
out to be false, but they are claims which many of us are pre-theoretically inclined to accept, so they are 
useful for getting a fix on the concept of well-being. 
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The desire view, like most theories of well-being, is principally concerned with non-derivative 
goodness and badness. To get a grip on the distinction between derivative and non-derivative value, we 
can start with a familiar sort of example. Getting a massage is merely derivatively good for me—it improves 
my well-being, but only because it causes me to have a pleasant experience, and that experience is itself 
good for me. In contrast, the pleasant experience improves my well-being in a way that does not depend 
on its being related to the value of anything else. If this is right, then the pleasant experience is non-
derivatively good for me. I will be exclusively concerned with non-derivative goodness and badness, as 
opposed to derivative goodness and badness. I will leave the “non-derivative” qualifier unstated, except as 
an occasional reminder.  
Desire theorists accept the Satisfaction Thesis: they claim that there are desires whose satisfaction 
is (non-derivatively) good for us in proportion to their strengths. Much less attention has been paid to the 
topic of desire frustration, but philosophers have tended to suggest that it is (non-derivatively) bad for us 
in proportion to strength of desire. This is what I call the Frustration Thesis. Shelly Kagan tentatively 
endorses it in a rare discussion of desire frustration (2014, p.172). And Chris Heathwood suggests that he 
and many other philosophers of well-being also accept it. Here is the opening passage of his introduction 
to “the desire-fulfillment theory of well-being”: 
The desire-fulfillment theory of well-being—also known as desire satisfactionism, 
preferentism, or simply the desire view—holds, in its simplest form, that what is good in 
itself for people and other subjects of welfare is their getting what they want, or the 
fulfillment of their desires, and what is bad in itself for them is their not getting what they 
want, or the frustration of their desires. Most or all desire theorists would agree that the 
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stronger the desire, the more beneficial is its satisfaction and the worse its frustration. 
(2016, p. 135) 
If Heathwood’s assessment is correct, most proponents of the desire-fulfillment theory accept the 
Frustration Thesis. 
The desire-fulfillment theory is strictly stronger than the basic desire view. It takes the positive 
claims of the basic desire view—that is, the Satisfaction and Frustration Theses—and adds that nothing 
else is non-derivatively good or bad for us. As Chris Heathwood notes, the desire-fulfillment theory is often 
regarded as the leading theory of well-being in the philosophical literature.3 The basic desire view is at 
least as popular. So I take it that the basic desire view articulates a widely-held view among philosophers 
of well-being. 
With that said, there is much disagreement among those who accept the basic desire view. One 
prominent point of disagreement concerns the question of which desires are relevant to well-being. For 
example, some philosophers claim that only informed desires are relevant; others claim that our desires are 
relevant only insofar as they are self-interested.4 One might also hold that our desires make a difference to 
our well-being only to the extent that they are informed, or to the extent that they are self-interested. (In 
 
3 Heathwood quotes Daniel Haybron as writing that it is “the theory to beat” and has been “[t]he dominant account 
among economists and philosophers over the last century or so” (2008, p.34). In a similar vein, William Shaw 
writes: “[...] the desire-satisfaction theory is probably the dominant view of welfare among economists, social-
scientists, and philosophers, both utilitarian and non-utilitarian” (Shaw 1999, p. 53). 
4 Purported examples of desires which do not have significance for well-being include ill-informed desires, other-
regarding desires, base or pointless desires, and remote desires. For a discussion of ill-informed desires, see e.g. 
Sidgwick 1907, p. 109–111. For pointless desires, see e.g. Rawls 1971, p. 92–93. For other-regarding desires, see Robert 
Adams 1999, p.87-88. For remote desires, see Parfit 1984, p.494. 
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that case, one would in effect deny that desires’ impact on well-being is proportionate to their strengths; 
instead one would say that their impact is proportionate to the products of their strengths and their 
informedness, self-interestedness, etc.5) For present purposes, I do not want to tackle these issues head 
on. Instead I will avoid them. I will assume that all the desires I describe in this paper are such that they 
satisfy whatever criteria are said to be relevant: they are equally informed, self-interested, etc. So, if the 
basic desire view is true, then the positive and negative significance of those desires should be 
proportionate to their strengths. These assumptions do not affect the substance of my arguments, but 
they make the discussion go more smoothly. 
There is another point of disagreement among proponents of the basic desire view, though it 
receives less attention than the issue of which desires are relevant to well-being. There is room to disagree 
about the relative significance of desire satisfaction and frustration 
Satisfaction Thesis: The impact on well-being of a given instance of desire satisfaction is equal to  
While I take it that the basic desire view is motivated by some plausible ideas—namely, that desire 
satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being, and that stronger desires have greater 
significance—I will not defend these general ideas here. Instead I will defend a conditional claim: if one 
accepts that desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being, in roughly the way that I 
have specified, then one should reject the basic desire view as an inadequate articulation of this plausible 
idea. Instead, one should embrace the distinction between attraction and aversion: two different kinds of 
desire-like attitudes, with differing significance for well-being. So I have two goals: the first is to show 
 
5 Thanks to [name removed for anonymity] for raising this point. 
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that the basic desire view goes wrong; the second is to show that it goes wrong because it fails to recognize 
the attraction/aversion distinction. 
In service of my first goal, I will argue that the basic desire view makes false predictions regarding 
asymmetrical desires: desires whose satisfaction has greater significance for well-being than their 
frustration, or vice versa. Given that there are asymmetrical desires—and, more specifically, given that 
our desires can be asymmetrical in both directions—it follows that the positive and negative significance of 
our desires is not always proportional to their strengths.  
To see what this claim comes to, consider the following pair of desires: 
Table 2.1 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Strong Desire +5 -5 0 
Weak Desire +1 -1 0 
The exact numbers should not be taken too seriously here. What’s important is that Strong Desire has 
greater positive and negative significance for well-being than Weak Desire. Whether one satisfies or 
frustrates Strong Desire, the result (all else being equal) is that one’s well-being diverges significantly from 
the relevant baseline state: the state of lacking the Strong Desire altogether. In contrast, if one satisfies or 
frustrates Weak Desire, the result (all else being equal) is that one’s well-being diverges less significantly 
from the baseline state. Weak Desire has less significance for well-being than Strong Desire. The upshot, 
here, is that the chart is consistent with the basic desire view. It is consistent with the claim that the 




Table 2.1 suggests that desire satisfaction and frustration have exactly opposite significance for 
well-being, in the following sense: for any pair of desires of equal strength, satisfying the first will raise 
one’s well-being exactly as much as frustrating the second will lower one’s well-being. And vice versa. Call 
this the Equality Thesis. It is natural for proponents of the basic desire view to embrace the Equality 
Thesis. But it is not mandatory. Proponents of the basic desire view might accept an Optimistic Thesis: 
for any pair of desires of equal strength, satisfying the first will raise one’s well-being more than frustrating 
the second will lower one’s well-being. They might illustrate their view as follows: 
Table 2.2 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Strong Desire +25 -5 0 
Weak Desire +5 -1 0 
The optimist can tell the following simple story. All else being equal, desire satisfaction is five times as 
significant as desire frustration. So, satisfying one’s desire has five times as much of an impact on one’s 
well-being (relative to baseline) as frustrating that same desire. At the same time, however, the positive 
and negative significance of a desire are proportionate to that desire’s strength. So, given that Strong 
Desire is five times as strong as Weak Desire, satisfying Strong Desire is five times as good as satisfying 
Weak Desire, and frustrating Strong Desire is five times as bad as frustrating Weak Desire. Thus, the 
optimist is a proponent of the basic desire view in good standing.  
For exactly parallel reasons, a pessimist could be a proponent of the basic desire view in good 
standing. They could claim that desire frustration is five times as significant as desire satisfaction, while 
also claiming desires’ the positive and negative significance are proportionate to their strengths. The basic 
desire view is broad enough to accommodate these varieties of optimism and pessimism. 
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 Crucially, however, a proponent of the basic desire view cannot accept the deliverances of the 
following chart: 
Table 2.3 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Positive Desire +5 -1 0 
Negative Desire +1 -5 0 
No matter the relative strengths of these two desires, it cannot be that the positive and negative 
significance of both desires is directly proportional to their strengths. For if Positive Desire is stronger, 
then its frustration should be worse (relative to baseline) than the frustration of Negative Desire—but it 
isn’t.6 If, alternatively, Negative Desire is stronger, then its satisfaction should be better (relative to 
baseline) than the satisfaction of Positive Desire—but again, it isn’t. There is no way that both desires’ 
positive and negative values are proportional to their strengths. So the basic desire view cannot admit 
such pairs of desires. It cannot admit them because they are asymmetrical in different ways: Positive Desire 
is weighted towards the positive; Negative Desire is weighted towards the negative. I will argue that there 
are such pairs of desires.  
These arguments are closely related to my second goal, which is to show that the asymmetrical 
desire cases can be neatly explained by distinguishing between attraction and aversion. I will appeal to the 
distinction in order to motivate the view that the relevant desires are indeed asymmetrical. This might 
sound circular, but it is not. My arguments would be circular if I were to define attraction and aversion in 
terms of their contributions to well-being. But that is not what I am doing. In motivating the claim that 
 
6 Technically, a basic desire theorist could hold that frustration disvalue is inversely proportional to desire strength: 
the stronger the desire, the less bad it is for one if that desire is frustrated. I take it that this is not a tenable position. 
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there are asymmetrical desires, I will only appeal to a psychological distinction between attraction and 
aversion. Then, having motivated the claim that there are asymmetrical desires, I will argue that nothing 
more than the distinction between attraction and aversion is needed to explain our normative judgments 
in these cases. 
We have a pre-theoretic grip on the distinction between attraction and aversion, though we do 
not always describe it using those terms. As I understand the attitude of attraction, it is implicated in all of 
the following claims: 
● I am looking forward to going to the movie. 
● I would love to get a new computer for Christmas. 
● I am pleased at the prospect of finishing my paper on time. 
When we are attracted to something, we regard it in a positive way. All else being equal, we are motivated 
to bring it about or maintain it. We can distinguish between “dispositional” and “occurrent” attractions. 
Paradigmatic instances of the occurrent variety are happy daydreams: about being fabulously wealthy, 
getting a promotion, kissing one’s crush, etc.  
The attitude of aversion, in contrast, is implicated in other claims: 
● I am dreading going to the dump. 
● I would hate to get a bucket of spiders for Christmas. 
● I am displeased at the prospect of finishing my paper late. 
When we are averse to something, we regard it in a negative way. All else being equal, we are motivated 
to prevent it or get rid of it. Again, we can distinguish between “dispositional” and “occurrent” instances. 
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Paradigmatic instances of occurrent aversion are ruminations: about going bankrupt, being fired, being 
rejected by one’s crush, etc. 
 Insofar as philosophers have discussed a distinction between positive and negative desire-like 
attitudes, they have tended to use the term “desire” rather than “attraction” for the positive attitude 
(Kagan 2014; Sumner 2020). I prefer not to use “desire” in this way, because it seems to me that desires are 
not purely positive attitudes. On the contrary, paradigmatic desires involve a mixture of positive and 
negative attitudes. To illustrate: suppose you strongly desire that there be clear skies today. Then, 
typically, you will not merely regard the prospect of clear skies in a positive way. You will also regard the 
prospect of cloudy skies in a negative way. And your negative attitude seems no less relevant to your desire 
than your positive attitude.7 The strength of your desire for clear skies—the degree to which clear skies 
matter to you—seems to be something like the “sum” of your attraction and your aversion.8 So it seems 
that aversion is, or can be, a component of desire, in which case it is at least misleading to contrast 
 
7 It is sometimes suggested that desire is a paradigmatic “pro-attitude,” where pro-attitudes are ways of “being for” or 
“being into” certain things. (See e.g. Heathwood 2007, p.25.) If this suggestion entails that desire is a purely positive 
attitude in the same way that I have described attraction as being a purely positive attitude, then I am inclined to 
reject the suggestion, and say that desires are not pro-attitudes in that sense. An alternative view is that “desire” is 
ambiguous, and on one of the meanings between which it is ambiguous, it refers to a purely-positive attitude (see 
Heathwood 2019). I cannot explore this alternative view here. 
8 Notice also that your negative and positive desire-like attitudes might both have the effect of motivating you to 
bring about the same outcome. If a wish-granting spirit offered to grant you clear skies in exchange for a fee, your 
delight at clear skies and your dread at clouds would both have the effect of making you more willing to pay a higher 
fee. Assuming that the amount of money you would be willing to pay is a rough proxy for the strength of your desire 
for clear skies, this is further evidence suggesting that both attraction and aversion are relevant to desire. 
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“aversion” with “desire”. It is better to contrast “aversion” with “attraction”, where attraction is explicitly 
understood to be a purely positive attitude, along the lines described above. 
More could be said about the difference between attraction and aversion. But for present 
purposes, it is enough that we have an intuitive grip on the attitudes at issue, and on the difference 
between them. That is all I need to motivate the view that there are asymmetrical desires: desires whose 
satisfaction affects our well-being more than does their frustration, or vice versa. 
§3 Normatively Asymmetrical Desires 
I can say with great confidence that I desire to not be covered in ants. It matters to me quite a lot 
that I not be covered in ants. This desire, like other paradigmatic desires, involves a mixture of positive 
and negative attitudes. But the positive and negative are not balanced. On the one hand, I am strongly 
averse to being covered in ants. I loathe the idea of being covered in squirming insects. But on the other 
hand, I am not strongly attracted to being ant-free. I normally take it completely for granted that I am at no 
risk of being covered in ants, so I am not particularly excited or grateful for the fact that I am not covered 
in ants. 
I claim that this desire is asymmetrical. On the one hand, having this desire and frustrating it makes 
me significantly worse off than I would be if I lacked the desire altogether. On the other hand, having this 
desire and satisfying it does not make me significantly better off than I would be if I lacked the desire 




1. Frustration: I am strongly averse to the prospect of being covered in ants. But as I walk to work one 
day, a clumsy myrmecologist spills her bucket of ants on me.  
2. Satisfaction: I am strongly averse to the prospect of being covered in ants. My walk to work 
proceeds as normal—I am never at risk of being covered in ants. 
3. Indifference: I am not at all averse to being covered in ants. Neither am I attracted to not being 
covered in ants. I simply do not care one way or the other. The myrmecologist may or may not 
spill her bucket of ants on me. Either way, I continue on my way to work without any fuss, 
brushing away ants if necessary. 
The space of relevant states of affairs can be organized as follows: 
Table 3.1 Covered in Ants Not Covered in Ants 
Desire Not to be Covered in Ants Frustration Satisfaction 
No Desire Not to be Covered in Ants Indifference 
My contention is that although Frustration is much worse for me than Indifference, Satisfaction is at most 
only slightly better for me than Indifference. Having my desire satisfied is, at most, only slightly better 
than lacking the desire altogether. Thus, my desire has asymmetrically negative significance for my well-
being: its satisfaction makes me only slightly better off, but its frustration makes me much worse off. 
 A few clarificatory points should be made here. First, we have to be careful in interpreting claims 
about what “makes us better off” and “makes us worse off”. “Better off” and “worse off” are comparatives; 
they can only be interpreted relative to some baseline state. In this case, crucially, the relevant baseline 
state is Indifference. I claim that I am much worse off in Frustration than I am in Indifference, and at most 
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only slightly better off in Satisfaction than I am in Indifference. Relative to Indifference, then, my desire 
has asymmetrically negative significance for my well-being. 
It might be natural to think that the relevant baseline state is Satisfaction. After all, this is the 
status quo for most of us: we are not covered in ants, and we desire to not be covered in ants. But if we 
take Satisfaction to be our baseline state, then this yields a trivial interpretation of the asymmetry claim. 
Of course Satisfaction has less significance for my well-being than Frustration, relative to the baseline state 
of Satisfaction.9 Satisfaction has no significance for well-being relative to Satisfaction; it does not make me 
any better or worse off. So we have to be careful to keep in mind that the relevant baseline is not 
Satisfaction but Indifference. The resulting asymmetry claim can be expressed as follows: 
Table 3.2 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Ants Desire +1 -5 0 
The numbers should not be taken too seriously here; the important point is that whereas Frustration is 
much worse for me than Indifference, Satisfaction is not much better for me than Indifference. 
A second clarificatory point: I am assuming that, apart from my desire not to be covered in ants, 
I do not have any further desires which make for a difference in my well-being across the three cases. And 
a third, final clarificatory point: I am ignoring the derivative goodness or badness of being covered in ants. 
Being covered in ants might cause some bad effects—I might not be allowed in my office, which would 
frustrate my desire to get to work. But I am ignoring these derivative, downstream effects, because I am 
concerned solely with the non-derivative value of desire satisfaction and frustration. 
 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point. 
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To get a grip on the comparison between the three cases of Satisfaction, Frustration, and 
Indifference, it can be helpful to imagine that they concern three different subjects: Anne F(rustration), 
Anne S(atisfaction) and Anne I(ndifference). My claim, then, is that whereas Anne F is significantly worse 
off than Anne I, Anne S is at most only slightly better off than Anne I. It would be appropriate for Anne I to 
feel very sorry for Anne F. But it would be quite strange for Anne I to feel very glad for Anne S. Although 
Anne S is perhaps a bit better off for having her desire satisfied, this does not amount to a very significant 
difference in well-being between herself and Anne I. The upshot is that the desires in this case are 
asymmetrical: they have more negative than positive significance for well-being. 
All the same considerations apply if we start at the other end of the spectrum, with a case of 
“positive” desire. Suppose, for example, that I desire to be on TV. When I see other people interviewed on 
talk shows, I often have pleasant daydreams about being interviewed myself. I am strongly attracted to 
the prospect of being on TV. On the other hand, I am not terribly averse to the prospect of not being on TV. 
I am not particularly frustrated or upset about the fact that, as things stand, I probably will never be 
featured on television. 
I claim that this is another asymmetrical desire. Its satisfaction (being on TV) would raise my well-
being more than its frustration (not being on TV) lowers my well-being, relative to the state of my not 
having this desire at all. We can once again appeal to a set of three cases: 
TV Desires: 
1. Frustration: I am strongly attracted to the prospect of being on television. I walk to work as 
normal—I am not stopped for a television interview. 
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2. Satisfaction: I am strongly attracted to the prospect of being on television. As I walk to work one 
day, I am stopped by a reporter who conducts an interview. Of course, I am excited and happy. 
3. Indifference: I am not at all attracted to the prospect of being on TV. Neither am I averse to not being 
on TV. I simply do not care one way or the other. The reporter may or may not pull me aside for 
an interview. Either way, I continue on my way to work unfazed. 
The space of relevant states of affairs can be organized as follows: 
Table 3.3 TV Appearance No TV Appearance 
Desire to be on TV Satisfaction Frustration 
No Desire to be on TV Indifference 
And the asymmetry claim can be expressed as follows: 
Table 3.4 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
TV Desire +5 -1 0 
Again the numbers should not be taken too seriously. The point is that whereas Satisfaction is much better 
for me than Indifference, Frustration is not much worse for me than Indifference. Having my desire 
frustrated is at most only slightly worse than lacking the desire altogether.  
Suppose that the three cases concern three different subjects: Trevor F(rustration), Trevor 
S(atisfaction), and Trevor I(ndifference). Then I claim that whereas Trevor S is significantly better off than 
Trevor I, Trevor F is at most only slightly worse off than Trevor I. The satisfaction of the relevant desire is 
more significant than the frustration of that desire. Thus, it would be appropriate for Trevor I to feel very 
glad for Trevor S. But it would be inappropriate for Trevor I to feel very sorry for Trevor F. Although Trevor 
F might be a bit worse off for having his desire frustrated, this does not amount to a very significant 
 
17 
difference in well-being between himself and Trevor I. The upshot is that this case, like the case of Ants 
desire, shows that our desires can be asymmetrical. In this case, however, the desire is asymmetrically 
positive. 
To account for the asymmetries, we need only leverage the distinction between attraction and 
aversion. We can divide up the work that desires are supposed to do in the basic desire view, so that 
attraction takes on desire’s positive significance, and aversion takes on its negative significance. In place 
of the original Satisfaction Thesis and Frustration Thesis, we can substitute straightforward alternatives: 
Attraction Satisfaction: It is non-derivatively good for subjects to have their attractions 
satisfied. The stronger the attraction, the better its satisfaction. 
Aversion Frustration: It is non-derivatively bad for subjects to have their aversions frustrated. 
The stronger the aversion, the worse its frustration. 
Having taken on these claims, we can provide straightforward explanations of what is going on in Ants 
Desire and TV Desire. I am strongly averse to being covered in ants, but only weakly attracted to the 
prospect of not being covered in ants. That is why it would be very bad for me to be covered in ants, but it’s 
only slightly good for me to not be covered in ants. Similarly, I am strongly attracted to being on TV, but 
only weakly averse to the prospect of not being on TV. That is why it would be very good for me to be on 
TV, but it’s only slightly bad for me to not be on TV. (Recall that all these claims are to be understood 
relative to the baseline state of Indifference.) The attraction/aversion proposal is well-suited to explain 
what is going on in these cases. 
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The basic desire view, in contrast, provides no easy explanations. Putting together the asymmetry 
claims regarding Ants Desire and TV Desire (and assuming those desires are roughly equivalent in 
strength) we can express those claims roughly as follows:  
Table 3.5 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Ants Desire +1 -5 0 
TV Desire +5 -1 0 
At most one of TV Desire or Ants Desire is such that its positive and negative significance is proportional 
to its strength. Either way, the basic desire view turns out to be false. There is no set of desires such that 
all and only those desires have positive and negative significance, and in proportion to their strengths. 
 In contrast with my interpretations of the two cases, proponents of the basic desire view must 
claim that Ants Desire and TV Desire share the same or similar significance for well-being. Assume that 
the two desires are the same strength. Then the basic desire theorist must offer some version of the 
following schematic interpretation: 
Table 3.6 Satisfaction Frustration Baseline (Indifference) 
Ants Desire +x -y 0 
TV Desire +x -y 0 
Different values of x and y correspond to different versions of the basic desire view. If x is greater than y, 
then the version is “optimistic”. If y is greater than x, then the version is “pessimistic”. If x and y are equal, 
then the version is “natural”. But however we fill out this schema, we will arrive at an implausible result. I 
will consider each of the options in turn. 
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 Suppose we say that x is relatively high. This claim yields the welcome result that TV-Satisfaction 
is much better for me than TV-Indifference. But it also yields the unwelcome result that Ants-Satisfaction 
is much better for me than Ants-Indifference. It is flatly implausible that I am significantly better off 
merely for dreading the possibility of being covered in ants. This implies that if I were to stop caring about 
being covered in ants—if I were to become Indifferent—then I would be significantly worse off. More 
generally, it implies that if I started to dread various possibilities to which I am currently Indifferent, I 
would be much better off.10 But these implications are absurd—aversion does not have that sort of positive 
significance. We cannot make ourselves better off by dreading various far-flung possibilities which never 
come to pass. So it is not plausible that the satisfaction of my Ants Desire is very good for me. 
 Similar issues arise if we say that y is relatively high. This claim yields the welcome result that 
Ants-Frustration is much worse for me than Ants-Indifference. But it also yields the unwelcome result 
that TV-Frustration is much worse for me than TV-Indifference. And it is implausible that I am 
significantly worse off merely for liking the idea of being interviewed on TV. If I were to rid myself of this 
desire, I would not be much better off. More generally, we are not much worse off for having happy 
daydreams about various far-flung possibilities which never come to pass. So it is not plausible that the 
frustration of my TV Desire is very bad for me. 
 
10 In response, the basic desire theorist might point out that we generally desire to rid ourselves of irrational phobias, 
and the frustration of these desires might make for a net decrease in well-being. This is fine as far as it goes, but it 
does not change the central point: my developing agoraphobia (for example) does not make it the case that my well-
being is increased by staying home all day. Merely being agoraphobic would not increase my well-being in any way 
at all—unless, perhaps, it causes me to feel pleased or grateful for the fact that I remain indoors. In general, our 
dreads and fears do not have any positive implications for our well-being, unless we come to feel grateful for the fact 
that our fears have not come to pass. 
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 Now suppose we say that x and y are relatively low. Then we will have to conclude that my TV 
Desire’s satisfaction and my Ants Desire’s frustration would be at most slightly good and bad for me, 
respectively. These results are again implausible. One of my greatest hopes is to be on TV, and one of my 
greatest fears is to be covered in ants. It would be quite good for me if one of my greatest hopes was 
realized, and quite bad for me if one of my greatest fears came to pass. At least, this is certainly what we 
should say if we are at all on board with the idea that desire satisfaction and frustration make a difference 
to well-being. 
 One who accepts the basic desire view might respond as follows. Both x and y are low because they 
concern possibilities which, at present, I regard as distant. It is hard to muster up strong desires regarding 
distant possibilities. But if the possibilities were no longer distant—as they would not be if I were in fact 
on TV, or in fact covered in ants—then my desires would be vivid. In those circumstances, the desires 
would increase significantly in both positive and negative significance. So it turns out that the satisfaction 
and frustration of those desires would have a significant impact on my well-being, even though they are 
not presently such that their satisfaction and frustration would have a significant impact on my well-being. 
Thus, one might argue, the desires might meet the proportionality constraint after all: they might both 
have significance proportional to their strengths. 
In effect, the proponent of the basic desire view is offering a psychological hypothesis about how 
my desires can be expected to change over time. But even if this hypothesis is correct, it will not get us far. 
Even in cases in which my TV Desire is vivid, its frustration may be no worse for me than lacking the desire 
altogether. Similarly, even in cases in which my Ants Desire is vivid, its satisfaction may be no better for 
me than lacking the desire altogether. 
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The clearest illustrations of this point are cases in which I am mistaken about whether my desires 
are satisfied or frustrated. Suppose I am walking down the street, and I see that a television in a store 
window is playing a video of me. The television is simply playing a live feed of the street in front of the 
store.  But for a few moments, I do not realize this. I briefly believe that I am being broadcast on television. 
So, for a moment, I vividly desire to appear on TV—and of course, this desire is frustrated. But it is 
implausible that the frustration of this desire seriously lowers my well-being, below the baseline state of 
lacking the desire altogether. If, upon realizing my mistake, I began to feel crushing disappointment, then 
that would be a way in which the frustration of my desire is derivatively bad for me. But suppose that, once 
I realize that I am not really on television, I am not at all disappointed. I simply laugh at my silly mistake 
and continue my walk. In this case, it is not at all plausible that I am significantly worse off for having my 
desire frustrated, relative to the baseline of lacking that desire altogether. 
The same kind of case can also be constructed around my aversion to ants. Suppose I am waking 
slowly from a dream in which my house has been infested with ants. Still half-dreaming, the tickle of the 
sheets on my skin feels like the movements of insects, and I briefly believe that I am indeed covered in 
ants. So I vividly desire that I not be covered in ants—and of course, this desire is satisfied. But it is 
implausible that the satisfaction of this desire provides a significant positive boost to my well-being, over 
and above the baseline state of lacking the desire altogether. 
 The attraction/aversion proposal can neatly explain the cases I have considered.  In contrast, the 
basic desire view struggles to explain them. I provisionally conclude that we should reject the idea that 
there is a single attitude—desire—whose satisfaction is good for us in proportion to its strength, and 
whose frustration is bad for us in proportion to its strength. Instead, we should run with the idea that 
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there are two attitudes—attraction and aversion—whose satisfaction and frustration are good for us and 
bad for us in proportion to their respective strengths. We should run with this idea at least until it runs 
into problems. 
 Accordingly, my next step will be to go looking for problems. In the next section I will consider 
some problems suggested by Shelly Kagan (2014) and Wayne Sumner (2020) for the distinction between 
positive and negative desire-like attitudes. I conclude that the problems they raise can be satisfactorily 
addressed, so desire theorists should adopt the attraction/aversion proposal as a working theory. We 
should reject the view that desires have fundamental normative significance for well-being; we should 
instead say that their normative significance is derived from the significance of attraction and aversion. 
§4 The Distinction Defended 
Shelly Kagan and Wayne Sumner consider cases of normatively asymmetrical desire (though not by that 
name) and they note that those cases make trouble for desire theorists. They both briefly consider 
solutions which appeal to a distinction between positive and negative desire-like attitudes. But, for 
different reasons, they both reject that solution. I will begin with Kagan’s objection, before moving on to 
Sumner’s objection. 
§4.1 Kagan’s Objection 
Here is how Kagan describes the distinct-attitudes view: 
Perhaps what the preference theory needs is to introduce a second psychological attitude, 
one that corresponds, in a negative way, to the positive attitude that preference theories 
normally describe. That is, just as there is a positive attitude—desire or preference—that 
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we can have toward certain objects (or states of affairs), perhaps there is a quite distinct 
negative attitude—call it aversion—that we can also take toward various objects (or states 
of affairs). And just as preference theory holds that when I want X and X obtains (so my 
desire is satisfied) this improves my level of well-being, so too it should hold that when I 
have an aversion to X, and yet X obtains nonetheless (so that my aversion is frustrated) 
this lowers my level of well-being. (2014, p.270; emphasis in the original) 
For Kagan, “desire or preference” corresponds roughly to what I call “attraction”. And we share the same 
usage of “aversion”. So I think that Kagan’s general proposal is correct. Desire theorists ought to 
distinguish between positive and negative desire-like attitudes, with differing significance for well-being. 
But Kagan himself rejects the proposal. He writes: 
[...] if preference and aversion are indeed logically distinct psychological attitudes, then 
as far as I can see, nothing rules out the possibility that one might have both a preference 
for X and an aversion to X—indeed both a preference and an aversion to the very same 
feature of X—at one and the same time. (2014, p.270; emphasis in the original) 
Kagan takes this to be a worrying result. He tells us: 
To be sure, we are used to the idea that some generally described object or state of affairs 
might be good for you in one way and bad for you in another. But in such cases, I think, 
we normally point to different features of the object (different aspects of the state of 
affairs), precisely so as to be able to say that the one feature of the object is good for you, 
while another feature of the object is bad. What seems troubling is the idea that a single 
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feature of a single object could be both intrinsically good and intrinsically bad for you 
simultaneously. (2014, pp. 270-271; emphasis in the original) 
Speaking for myself, I do not find this to be a terribly troubling result. Suppose that I will soon be 
sharing a long car ride with Bill, a friend of mine from high school. On the one hand, he is an old friend 
who I have not seen in a long time. On the other hand, our interests and personalities drifted apart long 
ago, and we no longer have much to talk about. Thus, I have mixed feelings. In certain nostalgic moods, I 
am attracted to the idea of the car ride with Bill. In other moods, I am averse to it. Under such 
circumstances, it is implausible that the car ride with Bill is purely good for me. Nor is it plausible that the 
car ride is purely bad for me. The normative facts, like my feelings, are decidedly mixed. With the details 
of the case thus specified, it does seem plausible—to me, anyway—that the car ride is both good for me 
and bad for me.11 
Let us grant, however, that Kagan is right: this is a troubling result of the distinct-attitudes view, 
and it is to be avoided if possible. Still, there are at least three ways to respond to the objection. If any of 
them are successful, the objection poses no special problem for the distinct-attitudes view. 
 
11  Interestingly, this would suggest that the goodness or badness of Bill’s presence is irreducible to its being better for 
me or worse for me than other states of affairs. For suppose that I am having a party, and both Bill and Briti are 
attending. I am strongly attracted to the prospect of Bill attending, and only weakly averse to it. Suppose 
furthermore that I am weakly attracted to the prospect of Briti’s attending, and not at all averse to her presence. 
Intuitively, then, Bill’s presence might have the same total value for me as Briti’s presence, owing to the balance of 
my attractions and aversions. In a ranking of states of affairs from best to worst, those two states of affairs would 
occupy the same spot. But they are not good for me to the same degree—Bill’s presence is better for me than Briti’s 
presence, because I am more strongly attracted to Bill’s presence than to Briti’s presence. They occupy the same spot 
in the ranking only because Bill’s presence is also bad for me, owing to the fact that I am averse to his presence. 
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 The first response is that we need not assume that attraction and aversion are “logically distinct 
psychological attitudes'' (2014, p.270). We have said very little thus far regarding the psychological natures 
of these attitudes, but ultimately, they might be understood in such a way as to rule out the possibility of 
a subject being attracted and averse to the same state of affairs. For example, we might say that being 
attracted to X is a matter of being disposed to have overall pleasant experiences insofar as one 
contemplates X, and that being averse to X is a matter of being disposed to have overall unpleasant 
experiences insofar as one contemplates X. If, as seems plausible, one’s overall experience cannot be both 
pleasant and unpleasant, then we could maintain that no one can be simultaneously attracted and averse 
to X. In the Bill case, we will end up concluding that due to the natures of the attitudes involved, my 
attitudes of attraction and aversion must target different fine-grained states of affairs. Perhaps I am 
attracted to the prospect of having nostalgic conversations with Bill, but averse to the prospect of having 
awkward conversations with Bill.  
A second response is that, even if it is possible to be simultaneously attracted and averse to the 
very same state of affairs X, proponents of the distinct-attitudes view can still avoid the conclusion that X 
is both non-derivatively good for one and non-derivatively bad for one. To see this, notice that there is an 
important ambiguity in claims like “it is non-derivatively good for you to satisfy your desire for pizza.” 
The claim could be saying that eating pizza is good for you, or it could be saying that eating pizza while 
desiring to eat pizza is good for you. On the second interpretation, but not the first interpretation, your 
desire is part of the overall state of affairs which is good for you.12 The second interpretation will be favored 
 
12 This ambiguity in desire-based approaches to well-being is explored by Jan Österberg and Wlodek Rabinowicz 
(1996), and by Joseph van Weelden (2019). 
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by those who side with Moore in thinking that nothing can have non-derivative value merely in virtue of 
its relations to other things, such as desires. If we embrace this Moorean interpretation, we have an easy 
response to Kagan’s challenge. Strictly speaking, X is not non-derivatively good for you. Neither is it non-
derivatively bad for you. Rather, X while you are attracted to X is good for you, and X while you are averse 
to X is bad for you. Or, in my case: sharing a car ride with Bill while being attracted to doing so is non-
derivatively good for me; sharing a car ride with Bill while being averse to doing so is non-derivatively bad 
for me. These states of affairs are distinct, even if they occur simultaneously. So no single state of affairs 
is both non-derivatively good for me and non-derivatively bad for me.  
The third response to Kagan’s worry is that it has nothing in particular to do with the distinct-
attitudes view. It arises for the basic desire view as well. As Kagan notes: 
Admittedly, it isn’t clear to me whether this problem arises only when we introduce the 
second attitude, aversion. After all, what should a fan of traditional preference theory say 
about the possibility of a case in which someone simultaneously wants both X and not X 
(by virtue of the very same feature)? Won’t this also be a situation in which the obtaining 
of X is both intrinsically good and intrinsically bad for that person? (2014, p.271) 
Kagan ultimately contends that the basic desire view is not equally vulnerable to the objection. But his 
reasons for thinking this are somewhat puzzling. Kagan suggests that it is irrational to desire X while also 
desiring ~X, but it is not irrational to be attracted to X while also being averse to X. So the basic desire view 
offers a kind of guarantee that X will never be both non-derivatively good and non-derivatively bad for a 
fully rational person. But the distinct-attitudes view offers no such guarantee. Thus, Kagan thinks, the 
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basic desire view (or as he calls it, the “traditional preference theory”) is to be preferred over the distinct 
attitudes view. 
Even granting Kagan’s claims about rationality, I don’t see how this is supposed to be an 
advantage of the basic desire view. Insofar as one has the intuition that nothing could be both non-
derivatively good and non-derivatively bad for the same subject, this is like having the intuition that 
nothing could be both uniformly green and uniformly red. It’s a metaphysical intuition about which 
properties can be co-instantiated with which other properties. It is hard to see how claims about rationality 
could be relevant. If I tell you that my wall is painted red all over and green all over, you will be skeptical. 
How could anything have both properties? Obviously I cannot assuage your skepticism by telling you that 
the painter was irrational. Similarly, if I tell you that my car ride with Bill was both non-derivatively good 
for me and non-derivatively bad for me—and if you think that this is rather like me saying that Bill’s car 
is both uniformly green and uniformly red—then you will be skeptical. Whether or not this skepticism is 
warranted, I cannot assuage it by telling you that I am irrational.  What seems strange, from your 
perspective, is the co-instantiation of prima facie mutually-exclusive properties. The whole topic of 
rationality is simply beside the point.  
It should be noted that Kagan does not claim to have given the final word on the distinct-attitudes 
view. He closes by reminding us “Obviously, more needs to be said about this issue, and others may not 
share my own judgments about these matters” (2014, p.272). I hope I have said enough to show that, 
ultimately, Kagan’s worries are not so worrying after all. At most, Kagan’s objection poses a problem for 
desire-based theories of well-being generally. It does not cast doubt on the distinct-attitudes view in 
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particular. So it does not cast doubt on the view that desire theorists should distinguish between positive 
and negative attitudes. 
§4.2  Sumner’s Objection 
Sumner considers a kind of desire theory which:  
...introduces a con-attitude – call it aversion – which involves disfavouring an object or 
shunning it or seeking to avoid it. A substantive bad would then be the frustration of an 
aversion: having the disfavoured object occur or obtain. (2020, p.427) 
Sumner keeps the word “desire” to refer to the positive counterpart of aversion, whereas I prefer 
“attraction”. But the proposal he considers is substantively the same as my proposal: we introduce a 
distinction between positive and negative desire-like attitudes, then use the distinction to explain what is 
going on in cases like Ants Desire and TV Desire. 
Sumner’s objection to the proposal is as follows. Suppose you desire that it not rain this afternoon. 
In that case, Sumner says, your attitude can be represented in three different ways: 
R1. Desire (It does not rain this afternoon.)  
R2. Aversion (It rains this afternoon.) 
R3. Desire (The weather is dry this afternoon.) 
But, Sumner claims, the different representations of your attitude cannot do any philosophical work. He 
says that: 
All three of these alternatives come to the same thing: that is, your positive desire is 
satisfied, your negative desire is satisfied, and your aversion is frustrated by exactly the 
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same state of affairs (a rain-free afternoon)... Nothing seems to be gained by introducing 
the negative element. The problem for the desire view will still be to distinguish those 
desires whose frustration constitutes a substantive bad from those whose frustration is a 
mere privation… (2020, p.428-429) 
Sumner’s objection is that, by articulating three different ways in which a single desire can be 
represented—namely R1, R2, and R3—we have not made any progress towards explaining what sort of 
significance this desire has for well-being. 
It seems clear how we should respond to Sumner’s objection: we should reject his assumption that 
R1, R2, and R3 merely correspond to different ways of representing a single attitude. We should insist that 
there is a substantive difference between positive and negative desire-like attitudes. 
We have different words for talking about these different attitudes. It might be that I dread the 
prospect of cloudy weather, whereas you are delighted at the prospect of clear skies. As Sumner says, our 
attitudes are satisfied by the same state of affairs: namely, clear skies. Nevertheless, our attitudes are 
different. Dread and delight are clearly different. And I claim that this difference in our attitudes makes 
for a difference in how our well-being would be affected by the weather. If it rains, my well-being is 
significantly lower than it would be if I lacked the desire. If there are clear skies, your well-being is 
significantly higher than it would be if you lacked the desire. 
We should be careful here. I am not merely making a point about how the weather will affect our 
feelings and emotions in different ways. It is true that clouds would cause me displeasure, and clear skies 
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would cause you pleasure, and that our pleasures and displeasures have impacts on well-being.13 But that 
is not the point I am making. I am claiming that the weather affects our levels of well-being differently in 
virtue of the difference in our attitudes: I am averse to clouds; you are delighted by clear skies. In line with 
the spirit of the basic desire view, I am proposing that the weather impacts us differently in virtue of our 
differing attitudes. I am not wheeling in any further explanans.  
I conclude that Sumner’s worry is misguided. We have good reason to think that attraction and 
aversion are distinct phenomena, and not merely different ways of talking about desires. It’s true that, if 
one appeals to the distinction between attraction and aversion, one should ultimately give an account of 
the difference between them. I plan to give such an account elsewhere. But there certainly is a difference 
between, for example, dreading clouds and loving clear skies, whether or not those attitudes are satisfied 
by the same state of affairs. 
§6 Conclusion 
I have argued that there is no single subset of desires whose satisfaction is non-derivatively good 
for us in proportion to their strengths, and whose frustration is non-derivatively bad for us in proportion 
to their strengths. For there are pairs of desires which differ with respect to their positive-negative 
asymmetries. Ants Desire is asymmetrically negative, and TV desire is asymmetrically positive. At most 
one of these desires can be such that its positive and negative significance is proportional to its strength. 
 
13 Sumner warns against this. He warns that desire theorists do not have recourse to “...invoking the experientialist’s 
resource: the quality of the subject’s subsequent affective experience” (2020, p.249). 
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 If we insist that the desires do not differ with respect to their positive-negative asymmetries, then 
we commit ourselves to strange claims. For example, we have to say that I am made significantly better 
off for dreading the possibility of being covered in ants, or that I am significantly worse off by 
daydreaming idly about being on TV. I have argued that there is no way to avoid making these strange 
claims, so long as we hold onto the basic desire view. So we should give it up. 
 Instead we should say that desires involve a mixture of two different attitudes: one of which has 
positive significance for well-being, and one of which has negative significance for well-being. The 
resulting view entails that desire has significance for well-being—but not fundamental significance. 
Rather, the normative significance of desire is derived from the normative significance of attraction and 
aversion. So I am not at all suggesting we give up on the idea that our desires are of great significance 
well-being. Instead I have aimed to show that its normative significance can be pulled apart. By doing so, 
we can move towards a more accurate theory of well-being. 
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